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STANDARDS AND NoRMs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The panel was convened at 11:20 a.m., Thursday, April 2, by its Chair, Alan 0. Sykes,*
who introduced the panelists: Jack Goldsmith, University of Chicago School of Law; Eric
Posner, University of Pennsylvania School of Law; and Kenneth Abbott, Northwestern
University School of Law.
NOTES TOWARD A THEORY OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

by Jack L. Goldsmith- & Eric A. Posner"*
Customary international law (CIL) is one of two primary forms of international law, the
other being the treaty. CIL is typically defined as a "customary practice of states followed
from a sense of legal obligation."' Conventional wisdom considers it a pervasive feature of
international law and international relations. Governments take care to comply with CIL, and
often incorporate its norms into domestic statutes. National courts sometimes apply CIL as
a rule of decision, or a defense, or a canon of statutory construction. Nations argue about
whether certain acts violate CIL. Violations of CIL are grounds for war, or an international
claim, or a diminution in international reputation. Legal commentators view CIL to be at the
core of the study of international law.
And yet CIL remains an enigma. It lacks a centralized lawmaker, a centralized executive
enforcer, and a centralized, authoritative decision maker. The criteria for the identification
of CIL are controversial and difficult to specify. The content of CIL is often in the eyes of
the beholder and frequently tracks the interests of powerful nations. We lack a convincing
account of how particular CIL rules originate. We do not really know why nations comply
with CIL. And we lack a good explanation for the many changes in CIL rules over time.
There is no convincing positive account of how these changes occur. And there is no
convincing normative account of how these changes-which are frequently premised on
"violations" of CIL-are consistent with the view that CIL is law. Finally, the standard
definition of CIL-(1) custom (2) followed from a sense of legal obligation-raises
perennial, and largely unanswered, questions.
This essay sketches the outline of a theory of CIL that sorts out many of these
difficulties. 2 The theory has two features that distinguish it from others. First, it seeks to
understand CIL on the basis of rational-choice principles rather than on the basis of notions
of legality or morality. Second, it suggests that the prevailing judicial and academic
treatment of CIL as a unitary phenomenon is a mistake. The label "CIR" subsumes a diverse
group of relations and behaviors that are best analyzed separately.
The Theory
The theory assumes that states act rationally and strategically in pursuit of their
perceived self-interest. What scholars call "CIL" are behaviors that may be usefully divided
into two categories. The first category comprises behaviors that reflect a state's self-interest
independent of the behavior of other states but which happen to be the same for all relevant
states ("immediate self-interest"). The second category comprises behaviors that reflect a
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state's self-interest given that other states engage in the same behavior. CIL is more
appropriately used to designate the second class of behaviors than the first.
To illustrate, consider an observation that during a certain period none of the relevant
states seize coastal fishing vessels. The first explanation is that states gain nothing by seizing
coastal fishing vessels: The diversion of naval resources produces a loss greater than the
gain from capturing the fishing vessels. The observed behavioral regularity-not seizing
fishing vessels-is best understood not to be an example of CIL, because it does not reflect
cooperative behavior. Saying that seizing fishing vessels violates a norm of CIL is like
saying that sinking one's own ships violates a norm of CIL.
The second explanation assumes that one state would do best by seizing the fishing
vessels of another state but only if that other state did not retaliate by seizing the fishing
vessels of the first state. The second-best outcome for the first state is mutual cooperation,
according to which neither state seizes the fishing vessels of the other. The third-best
outcome is mutual predation, and the worst outcome occurs when the first state refrains from
seizing the boats of the second state, but the second state does seize the boats of the first.
This last form of strategic interaction is a prisoner'sdilemma. If the states can solve the
prisoner's dilemma, then the resulting outcome-nonseizure of fishing boats-can be
considered an instance of cooperation that constitutes a norm of CIL.
States can overcome the prisoner's dilemma in narrow circumstances. As is well known,
when the prisoner's dilemma is repeated over an indefinite time, the optimal outcome
becomes possible in each round. This assertion is based on several assumptions. First, the
players have sufficiently low discount rates: They care about the future relative to the
present. Rogue states-states controlled by irrational or impulsive leaders, or states with
unstable political systems, or states in which citizens do not enjoy stable expectations-have
relatively high discount rates. Second, the game must continue indefinitely, in the sense that
players expect it either never to end or to end only with a sufficiently low probability. Care
should be taken when analyzing the parameters of a game. Norms of war (such as the
humane treatment of prisoners) might exist because (1) belligerents foresee interaction
ceasing at the end of the war but do not know when the war will end, and refrain from
"cheating" during the war (such as by killing prisoners) in the expectation that the enemy
will do the same; (2) belligerents foresee interaction continuing after the war ends, and fear
that "cheating" during the war may invite retaliation after the war; or (3) belligerents care
about their reputation among neutrals, and fear that neutrals will interpret their failure to
abide by the norms of war as an indication that they have high discount rates and thus are
untrustworthy partners for alliances. Third, the payoffs from defection must not be too high
relative to the payoffs from cooperation. Notice that because payoffs may change over time,
a relationship may succeed for a while and then, after a sudden change in payoffs, collapse.
Fourth, states must have sufficient information about each other's payoffs and strategies. In
the standard models, players have complete and perfect information. Fifth, states must
choose sufficiently cooperative strategies, such as tit-for-tat or a variant. Strategies that are
too forgiving invite exploitation; strategies that are too nasty risk a breakdown in
cooperation.
One implication of these five assumptions is that the likelihood of the optimal outcome
decreases as the number of players increases. It seems clear as a matter of theory, intuition
and evidence that two individuals or states playing a well-defined repeat prisoner's dilemma
can sustain the optimal outcome. But theory suggests that a similar game played by many
individuals or states will result in suboptimal cooperation. Cooperation can be sustained only
if players adopt extreme strategies (such as always defecting if one other player ever defects)
that are not observed in the real world. Accordingly, we hypothesize that when multistate
behavioral regularities are observed, they are usually due to (1) coincidental self-interest
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among all states or (2) bilateral resolution of pairwise repeat prisoner's dilemmas, either
among all pairs of states or among at least one pair while all other states acting in immediate
self-interest engage in the same behavior.
We use this theory initially to make several positive claims about CIL, based on case
studies of the CIL of prize, neutrality, diplomatic immunity and maritime jurisdiction.
Several considerations lead us to rely on these traditional CIL examples. First, they are
prominent and well-documented instances of CIL. Second, they flourished before World
War II. For several reasons, this means they present relatively uncomplicated examples
against which to test our theory. They developed before the modem explosion of
international organizations that facilitate international cooperation and obscure the
independent function performed by CIL. In addition, much of the "new" CIL that has grown
up since World War II concerns not inter-national relations as traditionally conceived, but
rather the way a nation treats its own citizens. This relatively new CIL of human rights
involves different sources and a different structure of strategic interaction than traditional
CIL.
Our first positive claim is that many behavioral regularities identified as CIL norms by
courts and scholars reflect simple behavioral regularities with no cooperative content. For
example, the most likely reason that many states did not seize coastal fishing vessels during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is that seizure served no military or
economic purpose. Whenever seizure of vessels served a military or economic purpose-as
in the case of large commercial vessels or in the case even of small vessels that interfered
with military operations-states seized the vessels.
Second, we claim that the behavioral regularities with cooperative content almost always
arose in situations that can be modeled as two-state iterated prisoner's dilemmas. The few
successful instances of cooperation with respect to fishing boats arose between states of
roughly equal power, which had proximate coasts, and had continuing relations. Rules of
diplomatic protocol are sustained because a state can retaliate for the abuse of its ambassador
by abusing the ambassador of the other state.
Third, the claim that rules of CIL are universally binding has no explanatory force. For
example, the ostensible CIL rule that belligerents cannot seize enemy property on neutral
ships turns out in some circumstances to be (1) a practice that serves the immediate warspecific necessities and interests of belligerents or, more often, (2) no custom at all because
belligerents continue seizing enemy property on neutral ships while purporting to comply
with CIL. Similarly, when states are engaged in bilateral relationships with many other
states, pairwise behavioral regularities may appear universal, but that is simply because
every state's self-interest leads it to the same behavior. Our research has disclosed no
instance of true multilateral cooperation described by CIL norms. Scholars who conclude
otherwise fail to support their generalizations with evidence of genuine multilateral customs.
They instead base claims about the existence ofa CIL norm on generalizations from pairwise
interactions (and even from mere behavioral regularities) or national pronouncements about
the content of CIL which either are contradicted by the state's behavior or are advanced by
the state for strategic purposes.
The Origin of CIL Norms
The simple theory explains how CIL norms can be sustained, but it does not explain
how they arise. But a few possibilities follow naturally from the theory.
CIL norms can arise when "neutral" behavioral regularities already exist because of
coincidence of interest, but payoffs change, creating a conflict of interest. To illustrate,
suppose that at time zero two states fail to seize each other's fishing boats just because their
navies have more valuable opportunities. At time one these opportunities disappear (e.g., a
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naval war with other states ends), and consequently the payoff from seizing fishing boats
becomes higher (in one round) than the payoff from not doing so. Each country must now
decide whether to begin seizing the other's fishing boats.
At this point, the status quo--not seizing fishing boats-is "focal," in the sense that
each state may recognize it as a possible desirable state of affairs and each state may
recognize that the other state may recognize that the first states sees it as a desirable state of
affairs. One state might rationally hold off seizing the other state's boats in the hope that the
other state recognizes that this is a mutually desirable strategy. Or, one state might not
realize that payoffs have changed, and the other state declines to alert the first state to that
fact by seizing its fishing boats, given that the other state prefers to preserve the status quo.
In contrast, if the status quo is that of mutual seizure of fishing boats, it will be much more
difficult for a CIL norm of not seizing boats to arise, given that each state knows that if it
stops unilaterally, the other state will be tempted to continue seizing boats. (A treaty is more
useful for changing the status quo; CIL norms preserve the status quo because the status quo
is focal.) The fact that the status quo always presents itself as a focal point, in contrast to the
infinite number of other possible strategy sets, accounts for why CIL norms tend to extend
over time once they get started (and may continue to prevail even after they are no longer
mutually desirable compared to an alternative).
It is not the case, however, that a "neutral" behavioral regularity is a necessary
predecessor to a CIL norm. Any focal point can stimulate the emergence of a CIL norm.
Suppose that state A and state B face a conflict of interest because of an exogenous change
in payoffs. Prior to this change, each state seized the fishing boats of the other. The change
could be, for example, wars involving other countries, which require the attention of each
state's navy. Each state still prefers seizing fishing boats to ignoring them in a single round,
but both would be better off over the long term if both refrained from seizing the boats.
There is no time for a treaty. State A might simply announce, "We will no longer seize the
fishing boats from state B, unless state B seizes our fishing boats." Ifstate B knows state A's
payoffs, it might very well believe state A. The joint action of ignoring unless provoked is
focal because of the announcement, which is credible because each state knows that this
strategy leads to the optimal outcome. Thus, a CIL norm can arise despite the absence of a
long historical practice. An example is President Harry Truman's continental shelf
announcement.
Extensions

Our initial analysis of CIL focuses on its essential structure. We extend this analysis in
several respects. First, we consider the possibility that states care about a general reputation
for conforming with CIL. The most useful approach to understanding reputation is with a
signaling model, according to which states engage in costly actions in order to show that
they are "civilized," as opposed to being "rogue states." Recall that rogue states have
unstable political institutions, with the result that citizens or leaders have high discount rates.
Signaling models suggest that civilized states engage in actions that rogue states cannot
afford to mimic, as a way of demonstrating the stability of their institutions and their
reliability in cooperative relationships. One possible example is the practice of sending a
head of state to the funeral of the head of a foreign state. This practice is costly, since the
head of state has other valuable opportunities; it also produces no material gain for the host
state. It is most likely done simply because the head of state wants to show the world that
the state's political institutions are stable enough to endure in his or her absence. (States
constantly in crisis cannot afford to do this.) Another example is the contribution of a small
number of troops to a multinational military action. A final behavior of great
importance-states' practice of claiming that they conform to CIL norms even as they
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